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Abstract 
Objectives 
We tested predictions about the structure and magnitude of method biases in single-source 
personality trait assessments. We expected a large number of distinct biases that would parallel 
the observed structure of traits, at both facet and item levels. 
Method 
We analyzed multi-method ratings on the Estonian NEO Personality Inventory-3 in a sample of 
3,214 adults. By subtracting informant ratings from self-reports we eliminated true score 
variance and analyzed the size and structure of the residual method biases. We replicated 
analyses using data (N = 709) from the Czech Revised NEO Personality Inventory. 
Results 
The magnitude of method biases was consistent with predictions by McCrae (2018). Factor 
analyses at the facet level showed a clear replication of the normative Five-Factor Model 
structure in both samples. Item factor analyses within domains showed that facet-level method 
biases mimicked the facet structure of the instrument.  
Conclusions 
Method biases apparently reflect Implicit Personality Theory (IPT)—beliefs about how traits and 
trait indicators covary. We discuss the (collective) accuracy and possible origins of IPT. Because 
method biases limit the accuracy of single-source assessments, we recommend assessments that 
combine information from two or more informants. 
Keywords: Measurement error, personality structure, cross-cultural, multi-method assessment 
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Source Method Biases as Implicit Personality Theory at the Domain and Facet Levels 
 
 Personality traits are hierarchically organized, with broad domains, narrower facets, and, 
at the item level, very specific nuances (McCrae, 2015).  McCrae (2018) has argued that the 
same hierarchical structure is found for method biases: In a single-source personality assessment 
(e.g., a self-report or an observer rating) the observed score is due not only to trait level and 
random error of measurement, but also to systematic biases on the domain, facet, and (perhaps) 
nuance level. The domain-level method biases, MD, affect all the facets in a single domain; the 
facet-level method biases, M, affect all the items in a facet scale. 
 Method biases refer to any systematic sources of error associated with the measurement 
of a trait. In this article, the term is used specifically to refer to consistent and enduring over- or 
underestimates of trait level made by a single respondent when rating a single target. If Mary 
believes Mark is highly anxious, it will be reflected in her responses to all items in an anxiety 
scale whenever she is asked to rate him. If in truth Mark is only moderately anxious, Mary’s 
ratings are biased. Biases contribute to internal consistency and retest reliability estimates, but 
not to agreement between independent raters. Some biases, such as social desirability, might 
affect a wide range of traits; in this article we are concerned with biases that are specific to a 
single domain or facet. 
 Evidence for the existence of MD is provided by a long history of research on Implicit 
Personality Theory (IPT; Borkenau, 1992). Passini and Norman (1966) asked judges to rate the 
personality traits of complete strangers; factor analysis of these ratings yielded a version of what 
would come to be known as the Five-Factor Model (FFM). Apparently people must have some 
idea of which traits covary.1 If they imagine a target is high in anxiety, they will also tend to 
believe the target must be high in self-consciousness and depression; they have an implicit notion 
of the Neuroticism domain. Different implicit assumptions contribute to separate factors for 
imagined Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. 
 McCrae, Jang, Livesley, Riemann, and Angleitner (2001) demonstrated the existence of 
MD in real personality assessments. They examined two intercorrelation matrices for the 30 
facets of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992a). The first 
was a mono-method matrix based on self-reports from one sample; the second was a hetero-
method matrix in which self-reports were correlated with spouse ratings in a different sample. 
Mono-method correlations were larger than hetero-method correlations, because the former 
reflected the influence of both true scores and method biases, whereas the latter reflected only 
the influence of true scores (assuming that targets and their raters did not share method biases). 
Subtracting the hetero-method matrix from the mono-method matrix left a residual matrix, ∆R, 
which represented pure method bias.2 When ∆R was factored, clear Neuroticism, Agreeableness, 
and Conscientiousness factors were found, and weak Extraversion and Openness factors. Method 
biases in these data correspond to what is termed MD in the present article. 
 In the present paper we first replicate this finding, using a stronger research design. In 
McCrae, Jang, and colleagues (2001), mono- and hetero-method intercorrelation matrices were 
based on different samples, because observer ratings were not available for the sample of chief 
interest. In the present study, both self-reports and observer ratings are available for the same 
sample. This means that there are two different ways of estimating MD. The first way is to factor 
the difference between intercorrelation matrices, ∆R (as in McCrae, Jang, et al., 2001).  (In these 
analyses, the mono-method matrix is the mean of self-report and informant rating matrices; the 
hetero-method matrix is the mean of self-by-informant and informant-by-self matrices). The 
second is to subtract the observer rating from the self-report for each individual, and factor these 
difference scores.3 We will designate the matrix of intercorrelations of facet difference scores 
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(self-reports minus observer ratings) as R∆. The second approach should be a more accurate 
indicator of the structure of MD, much as a paired t-test is more powerful than an independent t-
test with the same N. 
 To our knowledge, no one has reported an analysis of the structure of facet-level method 
bias, which might be considered an investigation of IPT at the facet level. Each domain in the 
NEO Inventories is composed of six related but distinct facets, and each facet is assessed by 
eight items. The mono-method correlations among items from a single facet (say, the eight N1: 
Anxiety items) result from three sources of variance: The anxiety true score, the facet-specific 
method bias, MFi, unique to the 8 anxiety items, and the domain-level method bias, MD, which is 
common to all 48 Neuroticism items. Together, the two method biases constitute the total 
method bias for the facet: M = MD + MFi, as discussed in McCrae (2018).  
 As with MD, the structure of M can be estimated either by subtracting the hetero-method 
item correlations from the mono-method correlations to generate ∆RI matrices for each of the 
five domains, or by creating item difference scores (self-reports minus informant ratings) and 
intercorrelating them to yield five RI∆ matrices. We will focus on the structure of method biases 
in the items within each domain by factoring RI∆s. 
 The primary analyses for this article are based on data from an Estonian sample; as a 
check on replicability and generalizability across cultures, we also examine Czech data. 
 
Assumptions, Predictions, and Analyses 
 Assumptions. The analyses of multi-method empirical data reported in McCrae (2018) 
used a model of the components of variance in personality trait scales and a set of simplifying 
assumptions. The components considered were the true score, systematic bias unique to an 
individual source, and random error. Those analyses divided true score into components at 
different levels of the trait hierarchy, but for the present purpose we will combine them. We 
define the true score as variance that is common to assessments from two independent but well-
informed observers (e.g., a self-report and a rating by a spouse, close friend, parent, or child). 
This presumes that, across a range of traits, different single sources are equally valid. (Ratings 
aggregated across multiple raters should be more valid than single ratings.) 
 This assumption is central to some aspects of the present article, because it implies that 
self-reports and informant ratings contain the same quantity of true score variance. ∆R will 
consist solely of systematic bias and random error—if this assumption is true. There are data 
consistent with this claim: Peer/peer correlations are comparable in magnitude to peer/self 
correlations (Funder, Kolar, & Blackman, 1995; McCrae & Costa, 2010); single peer ratings tend 
to show comparable validities to self-reports in the prediction of behavioral criteria (Kolar, 
Funder, & Colvin, 1996; Vazire & Mehl, 2008); and  self-reports and spouse ratings have similar 
longitudinal stability (Costa & McCrae, 1988).  
 We also assume that both self-reports and informant ratings have similarly structured and 
quantitatively equal method bias components; this implies also that they have equal amounts of 
random error. Further, we assume that the same proportion of the different components of 
variance is found in all items, in all facets, and in all domains. Although in fact there are 
systematic differences (see McCrae, Kurtz, Yamagata, & Terracciano, 2011, for differences on 
the facet level), they are relatively small and should not affect the general conclusions drawn 
here. 
 If the proportion of true score variance in self-reports and informant ratings is identical, 
then subtracting informant ratings from self-reports should eliminate true score variance and 
yield difference scores that consist only of method bias and random error. However, this will 
only be true if the total variance is the same for both sources. We therefore standardize all facet 
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scales and items as z-scores prior to calculating the difference scores on which R∆ and RI∆ are 
based. 
 As a reviewer noted, even if self-reports and informant ratings in general have equal 
quantities of true score variance, this will not necessarily be the case for individual targets. An 
observer rating may be based on insufficient information about the target; a self-report may be 
compromised by a lack of insight. Whenever the two sources differ in the validity of their scores, 
subtracting will not totally eliminate the true score component, and R∆ and RI∆ will be 
“contaminated” to some degree by true score variance. This in turn implies that the factor 
structures of R∆ and RI∆ is not determined entirely by method variance. 
 However, given that most of the informants used in the present study are family members 
or partners who know the target well, it seems plausible that their ratings will be accurate and the 
difference between the validity of observer ratings and self-reports will probably be quite small 
for the great majority of targets. This suggests that the factor structures of R∆ and RI∆ will be 
determined primarily by method biases. 
 Note also that this problem does not affect analyses of ∆R and ∆RI (where a hetero-
method matrix is subtracted from a mono-method matrix), because these depend only on the 
variance in the sample as a whole. To the extent that the structures of R∆ and RI∆ resemble those 
of ∆R and ∆RI, we can conclude that both represent the same structure of method biases. 
 Predictions. We offer both qualitative and quantitative predictions. The qualitative 
predictions are straightforward: When we factor the 30 facet differences, we expect to find the 
standard FFM structure of the NEO Inventories (McCrae & Costa, 2010); when we factor the 48 
item differences within each domain, we expect the factors will correspond to the a priori facet 
scales. If these hypotheses are confirmed, they will support the view that method biases mimic 
the hierarchical structure of traits. 
 However, previous research has also suggested that method bias can be quantified.  
McCrae (2018) used American data on the mono-method correlations among personality traits 
within a domain and on cross-observer agreement on domains and facets to estimate the value of 
MD at .17 (that is, 17% of facet score variance). It is possible to test that prediction using an 
entirely different method of analysis in the present dataset. Consider the intra-domain cross-facet 
correlations (e.g., N1: Anxiety with N2: Angry Hostility). Within each of the five domains there 
are 15 pairs of facets, so we are concerned with the values for 75 correlations. In mono-method 
data, these are due to shared domain-level true score variance (e.g., Neuroticism) as well as 
shared domain-level method bias, MD. In hetero-method data (e.g., self-reported N1: Anxiety 
with observer rated N2: Angry Hostility) they are due only to domain-level true score variance. 
The mean of the differences between mono-method and hetero-method intra-domain, cross-facet 
correlations in ∆R is an estimate of MD. If the model holds, and if American findings generalize 
to the present Estonian  and Czech data, we would expect the mean value of the 75 relevant 
entries in ∆R to be about .17. 
 When analyses are conducted at the individual level (examining the correlations among 
difference scores for individual targets), a different value is predicted for the observed 
correlations. Each facet is composed of true score, MD, and error (both random and systematic at 
the item level). McCrae (2018) estimated that these three account for 41%, 17%, and 42% of the 
variance, respectively. Because, ex hypothesi, the same amount of true score is found in self-
reports and observer ratings, (almost) all true score variance is removed when the scores are 
subtracted, and the difference scores consist solely of MD and error. The value of the 75 relevant 
entries in R∆ should thus be MD / (MD + error) = .17 / (.17 + .42) = .29. Because .29 is 
substantially larger than .17, factoring R∆ is likely to yield a clearer structure than factoring ∆R. 
 It is also possible to test quantitative predictions about facet-level method bias, M, by 
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examining individual items. McCrae (2015) used a meta-analysis of American and international 
data on the internal consistency, retest reliability, and cross-observer agreement for facets to 
estimate mean M at .13 for individual items. Here we assess M with a different approach: by 
analyzing intra-facet, cross-item correlations (e.g. N1: Anxiety Item 1 with N1: Anxiety Item 2). 
Within each of the 30 facets there are 28 pairs of items, so we are concerned with the values for 
840 correlations. In mono-method data, these are due to shared facet-level true score variance 
(e.g., Anxiety) as well as shared facet-level method bias, M. In hetero-method data they are due 
only to facet-level true score variance. The mean of the 840 relevant entries in the five ∆RI 
matrices thus is an estimate of M. If the model holds and if findings generalize to the present 
samples, we would expect a mean value of about .13.  
 Each individual item score is composed of true score, M, and error. McCrae (2015) 
estimated that these three account for 36%, 13%, and 51% of the item variance, respectively. The 
difference scores consist almost entirely of M and error, and the value of the 840 relevant entries 
in RI∆ should thus be M / (M + error) = .13 / (.13 + .51) = .20.  
 The assumption that source method bias is shaped by IPT does not rule out the possibility 
that higher-order biases, such as social desirability, may also influence observed structure. We 
consider this possibility by examining the relative magnitude of the first eigenvalue in different 
matrices. Evaluative bias would tend to inflate the first unrotated factor relative to the other 
factors. 
 Analyses. ∆R and ∆RIs are calculated as the mean of the two mono-method correlation 
matrices (self-reports and informant ratings) minus the mean of the two hetero-method 
correlation matrices (self-reports × informant ratings and informant ratings × self-reports). 
Diagonal values are fixed at 1.0. 
 To examine the structure of domain-level method bias,4 we extract five principal 
components from ∆R and R∆. We examine varimax-rotated factors and their congruence with 
the normative NEO-PI-R structure (Costa & McCrae, 1992a). As is customary with replications 
of the NEO Inventory structure (e.g., McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 Members, 2005), we then 
perform a Procrustes rotation to maximize alignment of the factors with the normative target; we 
report congruence coefficients of these re-rotated factors with the normative structure. 
 To examine the structure of facet-level method bias, we extract six principal components 
from RI∆ for each domain. No normative item-level structure has been published for the NEO 
Inventories, so a different method must be used to evaluate the optimal fit of the observed factors 
to the a priori facet structure (cf. McCrae & Costa, 2008). Using data from individual 
respondents, we calculate method facet scores by subtracting standardized informant facet scores 
from the corresponding self-report scores (as for the creation of R∆). We then calculate method 
item factor scores for each varimax-rotated factor from RI∆ and correlate these with the method 
facet scores; this allows us to determine the convergent and discriminant validity of the varimax 
factors in relation to the a priori facets.  
 But item analyses are often distorted by acquiescent responding, which inflates 
correlations between like-keyed items and attenuates correlations between unlike-keyed items 
(McCrae, Herbst, & Costa, 2001). This in turn can distort the factor structure, because factors 
will tend to be defined, at least in part, by items keyed in the same direction, regardless of 
content. To minimize these effects, we rotate the method item factors to maximize their 
convergent and discriminant validity with the a priori method facets (McCrae & Costa, 1989). 
Because the facets are balanced to control for the effects of acquiescence, the item factors that 
maximally correlate with them will also be relatively free from acquiescence effects.  
 As noted above, analyses of RI∆ may be influenced to some degree by residual true score 
variance, whereas analyses of ∆RI should not be. We therefore also calculated the convergent 
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and discriminant validity of method item factors using factor scores based on the factor structure 
of ∆RI. Strong convergent correlations will demonstrate that method item factors replicate the 
item structure of NEO Inventory domains. 
 Targeted rotations are a form of confirmatory factor analysis, and because orthogonal 
rotations are used, there is little opportunity to capitalize on chance (McCrae, Zonderman, Costa, 
Bond, & Paunonen, 1996). Because they yield the optimal fit within the data, they are 
particularly useful as a way to falsify hypotheses. 
 
Method 
Samples 
 Estonian participants constituted a subset of the Estonian Biobank cohort study, a 
volunteer-based sample of the Estonian resident adult population, recruited by general 
practitioners and hospital staff and using other means (for details see Leitsalu et al., 2014; 
personality data were integrated only into the last phase of the study). Each participant signed an 
informed consent form.  This study uses data from 3,214 cohort members (aged 18-91 yrs., M = 
46.48, SD = 17.00; 1,895 women) for whom both personality self-reports and informant-ratings 
were available and complete.5 Most informants were a spouse/partner (45%), family member 
(29%) or friend (15%).   
 The Czech sample, described in McCrae and colleagues (2004), comprised 709 
participants (aged 15 to 81, M = 36.03, SD = 14.02, age unknown for 9 participants; 294 men) for 
whom both complete self- and informant-ratings were available. The informants were often the 
participants’ partners (also aged between 15 and 81 with a mean of 36.10 years; 298 of the 
informants were men).  
 
Measure 
 In the Estonian data, participants and their knowledgeable informants completed the 
Estonian version of the NEO Personality Inventory-3 (NEO-PI-3; McCrae & Costa, 2010). The 
NEO-PI-3 has 240 items that measure 30 personality facets, which are then grouped into the five 
FFM domains, each including six facets consisting of eight items. The items were answered on a 
five-point Likert scale (0 = false/strongly disagree to 4 = true/strongly agree). For cross-rater 
correlations, see Mõttus and colleagues (2014). In the Czech data, self- and informant-ratings 
were provided using the self- and informant-report version of the Czech translation of the NEO-
PI-R (Hřebíčková, 2004).  
 
Results and Discussion 
Point Predictions 
 We estimated that domain-level method variance in facet scales, MD, should account for 
about 17% of the total facet variance. In the present data we calculated this as the mean intra-
domain cross-facet correlation in ∆R. In the Estonian sample, observed values ranged from .11 
for Openness to .24 for Conscientiousness, with a mean of .18 (.17 in the Czech sample), close to 
the predicted value of .17. The corresponding value in R∆ was predicted to be .29; that value 
represents the ratio of domain-level method variance to method variance plus error. The 
observed values ranged from .22 for Openness to .45 for Conscientiousness, with a mean of .35 
(.33 in the Czech sample). The observed mean value of .35 is appreciably larger than the 
predicted value of .29, but the difference can readily be accounted for. The prediction was based 
on calculations by McCrae (2018) that estimated cross-observer agreement on facets from data 
that included both peers (friends and co-workers) and family members (spouses and siblings). 
Peers show substantially less agreement with self-reports than do family members, yielding an 
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overall average agreement of .41. In the present sample, most informants were spouses or other 
family members, and the mean cross-observer agreement was .49—exactly the figure found for 
self/spouse correlations in the American data (McCrae, 2018). Subtracting this true score 
component leaves .51, and the predicted mean value in R∆ becomes .18 / .51 = .35, the value 
observed. 
 We estimated that method variance in individual items, M, should account for about 13% 
of the total item variance. In the present data we calculated this as the mean intra-facet cross-
item correlation difference in ∆RI. Observed values ranged from .08 for E5: Excitement Seeking 
to .20 for A5: Modesty, with a mean of .13 (.12 in the Czech data), as predicted. The 
corresponding value in RI∆ was predicted to be .20; that value represents the ratio of facet 
method variance to method variance plus error. The observed means ranged from .13 for A4: 
Compliance to .27 for A5: Modesty, with a mean of .18 (.17 in the Czech data). Predictions 
about the quantity of method bias were largely supported. 
 All cross-method cross-facet and cross-item correlations (the true structure of facet and 
item correlations) as well as ∆R, R∆, ∆RI, and RI∆ for both Estonian and Czech data are 
available at the Open Science Framework repository (https://osf.io/xdjpw).  
 
The Structure of Domain-Level Method Biases 
 We examined the structure of method biases at the domain level by factoring ∆R and R∆, 
matrices from which the covariation due to true score had been removed. In the Estonian data, 
we considered both varimax and targeted rotations of factors from the two matrices. The four 
sets of factor loadings were almost identical (all factor congruences > .97; all total congruence 
coefficients = .99), except that loadings from the analysis of ∆R were smaller in absolute 
magnitude: The five factors accounted for 35.6% of the variance in ∆R, but 53.1% in R∆. The 
fact that the factor structure of R∆ parallels that of ∆R suggests that the structure is not due 
solely to residual true score variance in R∆. 
 When compared to the American normative structure, all four solutions showed factor 
congruences > .92 and total congruences > .95. We illustrate results in Table 1, which provides 
the factor structure of R∆ rotated to the American normative structure. Factor and total 
congruence coefficients are all > .92, supporting the hypothesis that the structure of method 
biases mimics the structure of personality traits. Table 2 reports the corresponding analysis in the 
Czech sample; here all factor congruences are > .94.   
 Although the results reported in Tables 1 and 2 closely resemble the usual factor structure 
of the NEO Inventories, it is essential to recall that they are the structure of biases, not 
substantive traits. To highlight that difference, variable and factor labels include a subscripted M. 
 Most of the facets in Table 1 show large variable congruence coefficients (VCCs; 
McCrae et al., 1996), all but two exceeding chance. Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider the 
two worst fitting items, E5M: Excitement Seeking and O6M: Values. E5M: Excitement Seeking 
has a much larger loading on OM (λ = .46; .38 in the Czech sample) than it does in the American 
target matrix (λ = .11), and O6M: Values is a poor definer of the OM factor (λ =.29; .31 in the 
Czech data) in this analysis. Does this imply that, for some reason, method bias structure 
deviates from the true score factor structure for these two traits, or does it mean that these scales 
operate somewhat differently in an Estonian sample and translation? With respect to E5: 
Excitement Seeking, an examination of the varimax structure of the mono-method matrices 
favors the latter interpretation. In Estonian data, Excitement Seeking has a substantial loading on 
the O factor in both self-reports (λ =.39; .28 in Czech data) and informant ratings (λ =.38; .30 in 
Czech data). These facts suggest that Estonian method biases faithfully mimic the structure of 
the Estonian NEO-PI-3, which in turn replicates the American structure well, though not 
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perfectly. 
 The case is different with Openness to Values. It is a reasonably good definer of the 
Openness factor in both self-reports (λ =.63; .47 in Czech data), and informant ratings (λ =.44; 
.53 in Czech data). Yet the variable congruence coefficient of the associated method facet scale, 
VCC = .78, is not beyond chance in Estonian data, and an even worse fit to the target in the 
Czech data (VCC = .55). Further, there is little agreement between the Estonian and Czech factor 
loadings for this variable, VCC = .70. In Estonian data, O6M: Values shows a strong negative 
secondary loading on the NM factor; in Czech data, it loads most strongly on AM. In truth, O6: 
Values is a clear definer of Openness, but this is apparently not reflected in the implicit 
understanding of the trait. 
 We had anticipated that the structure of R∆ would be appreciably clearer than the 
structure of ∆R, when in fact they were equally clear replications of the normative structure. 
Presumably this is a function of the large sample size: With data from over 6,000 respondents, 
even small correlations will yield a robust structure.  
 We have said that domain-level method biases mimic the structure of personality traits, 
but what we have in fact demonstrated is that they mimic the structure of observed data—in this 
case, self-reports of Americans—which is shaped by both true scores and method biases. Is it 
possible that the true score structure is itself different from the observed structure? It could not 
be greatly different; if it were, the combination of true score and method biases would yield an 
observed structure that differed from the method structure. In the present data, the true score 
structure can be estimated directly from an analysis of the hetero-method correlation matrix, and 
congruences between varimax factors of that matrix and the normative structure all exceed .95 
(.94 to .97 in the Czech data). The structures of true scores, method biases, and observed scores 
are all essentially the same at the domain level. 
 Although the structure of method biases is the same as the structure of true scores, the 
biases themselves are of course completely different. The biases in self-reports are statistically as 
well as conceptually independent of true scores, but also of the biases in informant ratings. Two 
raters of a target agree just to the extent they share true score variance; they differ because of 
both source method bias and random error. Summing two ratings of a target aggregates and 
enhances true score, but not bias. 
 
Evaluative Bias 
 A general evaluative bias contrasting unfavorable with favorable traits might be expected 
to contribute to the first unrotated factor (contrasting Neuroticism with the other four domains). 
A reviewer suggested that we examine the magnitude of the first eigenvalue as a proportion of 
the total variance explained by the five factors. If evaluative bias contributes to method variance, 
the first factor should be largest in R∆, which contains only method bias and error; smaller in the 
two mono-method matrices, where the structure is determined by both true score and method 
bias; and smallest in the hetero-method matrix, which excludes method bias. For all these 
matrices, parallel analysis suggested five factors (eigenvalues are reported in the Open Science 
Framework repository). As predicted, in the Estonian data the first unrotated factor accounted for 
43% of the explained variance in R∆; 37% and 38% in the self-report and informant rating 
matrices, respectively; and 33% in the hetero-method matrix. The corresponding values in the 
Czech data were 40%, 33%, 31%, and 29%. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that, in 
addition to IPT, a general evaluative bias contributes to the domain-level structure. 
 
The Structure of Facet-level Method Biases 
 For each of the five domains, we factored RI∆ and calculated factor scores for six 
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varimax-rotated factors. We then correlated these factor scores with the six a priori method facet 
scores. Of these 180 correlations, 170 (94%) were positive, reflecting the effect of MD on all 48 
items in a domain. Yet facet-specific method biases, MFi, were demonstrated by the convergent 
and discriminant validity of method item factors within each domain. Using a correlation of .70 
as a criterion, we found that 22 of the 30 method item factors (19 in the Czech data) showed a 
one-to-one correspondence with one of the a priori method facets. 
 We then rotated the item factors to maximally correlate with the method facet scores, and 
again examined their convergent and discriminant validity. In this solution, 178 of the 180 
correlations (99%) were positive (170 [94%] in the Czech data). The first column for each 
domain in Table 3 reports convergent correlations in the Estonian data. For example, the 
correlation of the first re-rotated factor with N1M: Anxiety is .73; the correlation of the second 
factor with N2M: Angry Hostility is .80. Convergent correlations ranged from .49 for the 
problematic O6M: Values to .93 for O1M: Fantasy and O5M: Ideas. The mean convergent 
correlation was .80; by comparison, the mean convergent correlation in analyses of observed 
item data was .81 (McCrae & Costa, 2008). No discriminant correlation exceeded .39, and the 
mean absolute discriminant correlation was .17. 
 It is possible that these results are attributable, at least in part, to the true score variance 
that remains in RI∆ when a self-report and an observer rating have different quantities of the true 
score component. We therefore factored ∆RI, which avoids this potential problem. We generated 
a factor scoring matrix and applied it to the item differences to create method item factor scores. 
After re-rotating factors to maximize convergent and discriminant validity, we correlated them 
with method facet scales, as shown in the second column for each domain in Table 3. These 
values are very similar to those derived from the factor analysis of RI∆, and suggests that the 
item structure is indeed determined by facet-level method biases. 
 Table 3 also reports corresponding analyses for RI∆ in Czech data, again with very 
similar results. Clearly, the structure of facet-level method biases closely resembles the a priori 
(and the observed) item structure. 
 
Sources of Structure in Method Biases 
 Most directly, this study is a replication in a much larger sample of earlier findings by 
McCrae, Jang, and colleagues (2001), which showed that domain-level method biases have the 
structure of the FFM. Beyond generalizing that finding to other languages and cultures (and a 
revised version of the instrument), the present research also demonstrated that facet-level method 
biases parallel the empirical structure of items in each domain. People apparently have an IPT at 
the facet level. 
 From one perspective there is nothing remarkable about this. The items in each facet 
scale—say N1: Anxiety—were selected to represent different manifestations of a single trait. If 
Mary attributes a high level of anxiety to Mark, it is not surprising that she describes him as very 
nervous, and very fearful, and very worried about the future. What this means is only that Mary 
has some conception of anxiety as a trait and some knowledge of how it is expressed. Such 
knowledge is likely to have come from personal experience in dealing with anxious people, from 
books or films that depict anxious characters, and from an acquired knowledge of the English (or 
Estonian, or Czech) language, in which words such as anxious, fearful, and nervous are 
synonyms. 
 The same argument can be made at the domain level. There are semantic similarities 
between different facets in a domain: A thesaurus (http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/distressed) 
lists anxious, peeved, and saddened—corresponding to the first three NEO-PI-3 Neuroticism 
facets—as synonyms for distressed. Just as the lexical hypothesis holds that every trait will have 
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been encoded in a natural language trait name, one might propose a semantic hypothesis, which 
posits that the associations between different traits will be reflected in the network of semantic 
similarities of trait terms. In this sense, IPT is internalized with language learning. 
 What does seem remarkable—even incredible—is that people should have such a 
comprehensive and detailed conception of human traits that they can make all the fine-grained 
distinctions that are attested to in the discriminant validities in Table 3, while at the same time 
recognizing the broader resemblance of facets that constitute a domain. Indeed, Table 1 suggests 
that they even understand cross-domain associations, such as the secondary loading of E3: 
Assertiveness on the (low) Agreeableness factor which is consistently found in observed data 
(McCrae & Costa, 1997). This appears to be a remarkable feat of human cognition, even if it is 
only implicit. 
 But the truth is likely somewhat different. Many individuals probably have only a rough 
idea of how traits covary (Sneed, McCrae, & Funder, 1998). But the factor structure seen in 
Table 1 draws on the collective knowledge of thousands of individuals, which is surely sufficient 
to account for its accuracy. The same wisdom of the crowd (Galton, 1907) was seen in a study of 
stereotypes of age and personality (Chan et al., 2012): When empirical profiles of traits for 
young, middle-aged, and older adults were correlated with personal age stereotypes from over 
3,000 individuals, the mean correlation was a modest .34. But the correlation with the consensual 
stereotype, in which judgments were averaged across all respondents, was .74. People—
collectively, at least—have a good deal of accurate information about personality traits (cf. 
Löckenhoff et al., 2013). 
 It is more difficult from the present data to assess the accuracy of the average individual’s 
knowledge. We can, however, get some notion by considering sample size, because larger 
samples will be needed when individual accuracy is lower. A crowd of thousands is clearly not 
necessary, because the results of the Czech data, with a sample of hundreds, are almost identical. 
We conducted further analyses to investigate this issue. From the Estonian sample of 3,124 we 
created 100 random subsamples, each with 100 cases; factored their R∆s; rotated five factors to 
the normative structure; and calculated the total congruence coefficients—in other words, we 
replicated Table 1 with a set of subsamples each of N = 100. We repeated this process with Ns of 
200, 300, . . . 1,000. The mean total congruence coefficient increased monotonically with 
increasing sample size from .89 for N = 100 to .95 for N = 600, and thereafter remained 
unchanged. Similarly, we factored RI∆s for 100 random subsamples of N = 100 to N = 1,000 
cases, rotated the method item factors to maximize convergent validity with the a priori method 
facet scales, and calculated the mean of the 30 convergent correlations. These increased from .72 
to .79 as N increased (the mean value in Table 3 is .80), and the largest discriminant correlation 
tended not to exceed .45 even with N = 100. 
 These analyses demonstrate that accuracy increases with sample size, but they also show 
that the basic findings of the present paper might have been discovered in much smaller samples; 
even N = 100 might have sufficed. That in turn implies that the average individual must have a 
relatively accurate, albeit imperfect, conception of the structure of traits and their indicators. 
Perhaps this should not be surprising. As long ago as 1975 Jackson showed that undergraduates 
given a conceptual definition of a trait could write items that validly assessed it. People are 
serviceable lay trait psychologists. 
 
Sources of Bias 
 IPT—at the domain and facet levels—can account for the covariation of biases, but it 
does not account for their origin. We know that if Mary overestimates Mark’s anxiety, she will 
also tend to overestimate his depression and self-consciousness; but why does she overestimate 
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his anxiety? There are several possibilities. Perhaps she met him at a time when he was worried 
about an upcoming medical procedure, and her first impression stuck. Perhaps she knows him 
only from a class in public speaking, a situation that Mark finds particularly threatening. These 
possibilities show that biases may have some basis in fact, but be overgeneralized across 
occasions or situations. In other cases, there may be no empirical basis for the bias at all. Perhaps 
Mary holds the mistaken belief that ectomorphs like Mark are usually fearful, or perhaps she is 
an amateur psychologist who attributes hidden anxiety to almost everyone. 
 
Implications for Assessment 
 The fact that method biases accurately reflect the true structure of personality (at least in 
aggregated data) should not blind us to the fact that they contribute nothing but error to the 
assessment of individuals. The general accuracy of the point predictions in this study lends 
support to the quantitative estimates of method bias in earlier articles (McCrae, 2015, 2018), 
suggesting that perhaps 40% of facet variance is attributable to systematic error, so the problem 
is certainly not trivial. Single-source personality assessments, such as the ubiquitous self-report 
scales, work as well as they do (Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 2006) because about 40-50% of their 
variance is due to true score—but they would work much better if we could rid them of method 
biases. 
 Psychometricians have known for decades that there are systematic errors in personality 
assessments, but almost all their efforts have been to assess and control only a handful of biases, 
especially acquiescence and social desirability (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). We did find evidence 
of an effect of evaluative bias (social desirability) in the relative magnitude of eigenvalues in 
different matrices. But the present study reinforces the conclusion of McCrae (2018) that there 
are a multitude of other independent biases in every assessment—for the NEO-PI-R there are at 
least five at the domain level and 30 at the facet level. Even if validity scales worked as a way to 
control bias (but see Piedmont, McCrae, Riemann, & Angleitner, 2000), it would be necessary to 
have as many different validity scales as there are substantive scales in an inventory. 
 Perhaps the only practical way to improve imperfect single-source assessments is to 
obtain multiple informants and combine their information. Although aggregated ratings do not 
eliminate method biases, they attenuate their effect, increasing the ratio of true score variance to 
error, and thus the accuracy of the assessment. The value of aggregating raters has been 
demonstrated empirically (e.g., Kolar et al., 1996). Many contemporary personality inventories 
(see Ashton, de Vries, & Lee, 2017; Soto & John, 2009) offer both self-report and informant 
rating formats; obtaining and integrating multiple perspectives on a target’s personality can 
benefit both clinical assessment (McCrae, 2018) and research (Costa, McCrae, & Löckenhoff, 
2018). 
 
Implicit Personality Theory Revisited 
 We have provided new evidence that single-source personality scale scores include true 
score, method biases, and random error, and that method biases mimic the hierarchical structure 
of traits. But is it possible that other models of variance components are also consistent with the 
observed facts? Consider these possibilities: 
• Traits and their structure are illusory (IPT1) 
• Traits are real but independent; their higher-order structure is illusory (IPT2) 
• Traits are real and lead to shared biases about structure (IPT3) 
• In addition to shared biases, there are independent biases with the same structure 
(IPT4) 
 When originally proposed, IPT1 was believed to provide a radical alternative to trait 
 
12 
theory: Instead of Allport’s neuropsychic structures, it was argued that traits were mere 
attributions, and their structure was imposed by processes of person perception in the form of 
IPT1 (Shweder, 1975). Such an interpretation was consistent with Passini and Norman’s (1966) 
data on ratings of strangers, but it was quickly ruled out when Norman and Goldberg (1966) 
showed consensual validation of trait ratings across informants.  
 That finding—subsequently replicated hundreds of times—implies that traits must have a 
true score component, but in itself it does not preclude the possibility that the observed FFM 
structure is an artifact of IPT2. Perhaps all the true score in each facet scale is unique, unrelated 
to the true score of any other trait.6 In this scenario, anxiety and depression are both real, 
consensually valid traits, but they are unrelated. The observed covariation of anxiety and 
depression as definers of a hypothetical Neuroticism factor might be entirely accounted for by 
method biases shaped by IPT2. This view is compatible with the observed factor structure in both 
self-reports and informant ratings, and with the observed cross-observer correlations for 
individual facets. 
 But IPT2 would also imply that intra-domain, hetero-method, cross-facet correlations 
(e.g., self-reported N1: Anxiety with informant rated N2: Angry Hostility) must be zero, because 
they share neither method bias nor domain-level true score. This is clearly not the case. Costa 
and McCrae (1992b) showed that the mean value of these semi-convergent correlations was 
approximately .20, and, in the present study, they were .18 and .17 in Estonian and Czech data, 
respectively. When we factored the hetero-method matrix we replicated the normative FFM 
structure.  
 We could also have ruled out the hypothesis that IPT2 alone produces the FFM structure 
using data comparing properties of facets and domains. Method bias alone might explain why 
domain scales have higher internal consistency and retest reliability than facet scales—the 
common method variance is aggregated across a larger number of items. But if all true score 
variance were unique to facets, summing facets into a domain would not lead to any substantive 
aggregation, and we would expect the cross-observer agreement and heritability of domains 
(which depend only on true score) to be the same as that of facets. In fact, they are substantially 
larger (McCrae, 2018; McCrae & Sutin, 2018), because domain-level true score variance is 
aggregated. 
 But there is another possibility. Suppose the true scores of facets are unrelated, but that 
the human mind perceives them grouped into domains, just as a succession of spots of light is 
automatically perceived as a moving object. Observers can detect with some accuracy the true 
score of each facet; suppose that from these data they construct what might be called  pseudo-
domain (DPSEUDO) scores as the average of facets grouped by IPT3. For example, a target with 
true T-scores of 58, 26, 35, 55, 40 and 50 for the six facets of Neuroticism might be perceived as 
having a DPSEUDO T-score of (58 + 26 + 35 + 55 + 40 + 50) / 6 = 44. Observers might then take 
this value into account in formulating a final estimate of facet scores, which would be a weighted 
combination of the facet true score (Fi) and DPSEUDO, plus error: Observed facet score = aFi + 
bDPSEUDO + cE. 
 This formula for the components of variance in a single-source rating could account for 
the mono-method correlations among facets within a domain, which is attributable to the shared 
component, DPSEUDO. Because different observers of the same target agree on the facet true 
scores, they would also agree on DPSEUDO, which might thus be interpreted as a shared bias. This 
would imply that the hetero-method, cross-facet correlations (due to shared DPSEUDO across 
raters) would be non-zero, which solves the problem that prompted IPT3.  
 But the pseudo-domain model of IPT3 in turn has a different problem: Not only are 
hetero-method cross-facet correlations non-zero; they are identical to the mono-method 
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correlations, because both depend solely on DPSEUDO. We know that the mono-method 
correlations are substantially higher, which must be due to a component that differs across 
observers—the domain-level method bias, MD. IPT4 proposes a better formula for observed facet 
scores as aFi + bDPSEUDO + cMD + dE. This formula is almost identical to that used by McCrae 
(2018), except that a pseudo-domain term has replaced the true domain term. Both terms are 
eliminated when informant ratings are subtracted from self-reports, so the substitution does not 
affect the basic conclusion of this article: Method biases mimic the observed structure of traits. 
 Although both pseudo- and real domain models fit the data examined here, there are at 
least two reasons to prefer the real model. First, facets in a single domain tend to have similar 
patterns of objective correlates, which cannot be explained by IPT4. Worldwide, women score 
higher than men on all six facets of Neuroticism (Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001). Adults 
score higher than adolescents on all six facets of Agreeableness (McCrae et al., 1999). 
Individuals who have used heroin or cocaine are lower on five of the six Conscientiousness 
facets (Terracciano, Löckenhoff, Crum, Bienvenu, & Costa, 2008). Divergent thinking scores are 
related only to the Openness domain, and within that domain they are positively related to all six 
facets (McCrae, 1987). These would be extraordinary coincidences if the facets in a domain were 
actually unrelated.7 Second, it is easy to account for IPT by assuming that it has been learned (at 
least collectively) from observation of real associations; on the other hand, it is difficult to 
imagine why wholly fictitious associations would be shared by people with many different 
languages and cultures. 
 One final possibility should be examined. IPT was first proposed to account for the 
structure of ratings of strangers, which must be created in the mind of the rater. But when people 
rate themselves or a target whom they know quite well, why not hypothesize that they simply 
respond to the content of each item, without any reference to assumed patterns of covariation? 
This model proposes that observed score is composed solely of true score and random error—as 
in classical theories of test reliability (Lord & Novick, 1968). However, this model would predict 
that cross-rater agreement would be limited only by unreliability, so cross-rater correlations 
should equal retest reliability. In fact, a meta-analysis (McCrae et al., 2011) showed that the 
median cross-observer agreement for NEO Inventory facets was .44, whereas median retest 
reliability was .82. The substantial difference between these values must be accounted for by 
stable method biases.  
 Of course, stable biases might arise from misperceptions of the target. Mary’s first 
impression of Mark as highly anxious might crystallize into an enduring view of him. Mary 
might also misperceive Mark’s other traits because of the occasions or contexts in which she 
formed opinions about these traits. But if these errors were solely a result of occasion or context, 
they would probably be unrelated to each other, and the factor structure of difference scores 
would be uninterpretable. Instead, it clearly mimics the FFM. IPT itself does not create biased 
perceptions, but it structures and guides them. Once Mary has decided that Mark is highly 
anxious, she automatically tends to view him as high on other facets of Neuroticism. 
 It is beginning to appear that, given what is known about the properties of traits, the 
hierarchical model proposed here of true scores, method biases, and error in relatively fixed 
proportions must be essentially correct. However, many refinements are possible. The 
assumption that all traits and all sources show quantitatively equal components of variance is 
obviously inaccurate; even different categories of informants (e.g., family members vs. peers) 
show somewhat different amounts of true score variance. Quantifying and explaining the 
differences would be useful. There are hints that there are method biases unique to nuances; that 
hypothesis should be directly investigated. It should be possible to estimate what might be called 
personal IPTs by analyzing ratings of a series of strangers by a single rater; how closely do such 
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personal IPTs resemble the consensual IPT seen here? Are biases consistent properties of 
informants across a wide range of targets—what Kenny (1994) called a perceiver effect—or are 
they unique to each particular combination of rater and target? Single-source method biases are 
ubiquitous, enduring, and problematic for personality assessment, and merit greater attention 
than they have yet received. 
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Notes 
1. It would be possible to explain the findings of Passini and Norman (1966) without recourse to 
IPT if one assumes that raters identified the stranger with a real acquaintance and provided 
ratings of that acquaintance. The structure of ratings of these real targets could yield the FFM 
even if individual raters had no conception of how traits covary. There are, however, a number of 
other lines of evidence (see Borkenau, 1992; Sneed, McCrae, & Funder, 1998)—including the 
present results—that make IPT the most plausible explanation for Passini and Norman’s 
findings. 
 
2. The mathematical basis of these claims is addressed in more detail in McCrae (2018). Briefly, 
each facet score for one source can be modeled as 
Source1 facet score = aD + bMD1 + cF + dE1 
where D represents the domain component for the target (e.g., the Neuroticism in an Anxiety 
facet), MD represents the source’s method variance common to all facets in the same domain, F 
represents the trait variance for the target specific to the facet, and E represents error; in the 
population all these components are mutually independent. The coefficients a, b, c, and d 
indicate the quantity of each standardized component in a given score, and are scaled such that a2 
+ b2 + c2 + d2 = 1.0. 
Under the assumption that two sources (e.g., self-reports and informant ratings) are equally 
reliable and valid, they must also contain the same proportion of method bias, and 
Source2 facet score = aD + bMD2 + cF + dE2 
The difference is 
Source2 – Source1 = b(MD2 – MD1) + d(E2 – E1). 
Differences scores thus consist solely of systematic bias and error, and because both of these are 
independent of trait true score, the difference score is also free of true score variance. 
 
3. These difference scores are substantially correlated with the self-report and informant rating 
scale scores from which they are derived, because they share method and error variance. 
 
4. We do not directly examine the structure of method bias in self-reports or in informant ratings. 
Instead, we examine the structure of self-report bias relative to informant bias: MDSelf  – 
MDInformant. However, that structure must be very similar to the within-method bias structures. 
Each observed correlation between self-reported facets, rS, is the sum of the correlation due to 
domain true score, rD, and the correlation due to domain-level method bias in self-reports, rMDS. 
The 30 × 30 matrix of observed correlations in self-reports, RS, is thus the sum of the matrix of 
true score correlations, RD, and the matrix of method bias correlations, RMDS: RS = RD + RMDS. 
Correspondingly for observer ratings, RO = RD + RMDO. We know that RS ≈ RO, because the 
factor structures of these two matrices are essentially the same (e.g., McCrae, Terracciano, & 78 
Members, 2005). Thus, RMDS = (RS – RD) ≈ (RO – RD) = RMDO, so RMDS ≈ RMDO. Further, both 
(RS – RD) and (RO – RD) ≈ ∆R, so RMDS  ≈ RMDO ≈ ∆R. Thus, the structure of self-report method 
biases must be essentially the same as the structure of informant rating method biases, and as the 
structure of ∆R that we examine here. 
 
5. These data have previously been used in several articles addressing other issues (e.g., Allik, 
Hřebíčková, & Realo, 2018; De Vries, Realo, & Allik, 2016; Mõttus, McCrae, Allik, & Realo, 
2014). 
 
6. Readers might argue that a more realistic possibility is that traits themselves are correlated, but 
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that the observed correlations are inflated by IPT. This is in fact exactly the model we describe in 
this article: Observed scores are influenced by true scores and method biases, both of which 
show the structure of the FFM. 
 
7. Of course, because they contain facet-specific variance, facets may also have distinctive 
correlates that testify to their discriminant validity. For example, N5: Impulsiveness is the only 
facet of Neuroticism that is related to body mass index (BMI; Sutin, Ferrucci, Zonderman, & 
Terracciano, 2011). Facets in a single domain may even occasionally show opposite effects: Five 
of the Extraversion facets are positively related to BMI, but E4: Activity is negatively related—
presumably showing the beneficial effects of exercise (Sutin et al., 2011). 
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Table 1. Factor structure of domain-level method biases (R∆) in an Estonian sample. 
 Method Factor  
NEO-PI-3 Method Facet  NM EM OM AM CM VCC 
N1M: Anxiety  .77 .00 –.07 –.09 –.09 .99a 
N2M: Angry Hostility .66 .05 –.14 –.43 –.12 .97a 
N3M: Depression  .71 –.20 .01 .04 –.12 .98a 
N4M: Self–Consciousness .65 –.31 –.05 –.05 –.15 .97a 
N5M: Impulsiveness .52 .25 –.06 –.29 –.34 .98a 
N6M: Vulnerability .59 –.08 –.13 –.07 –.50 .96a 
       
E1M: Warmth –.22 .67 .10 .25 .24 .97a 
E2M: Gregariousness –.24 .63 .09 –.05 –.09 .97a 
E3M: Assertiveness –.27 .43 .09 –.44 .31 .97a 
E4M: Activity –.14 .55 .20 –.19 .33 .96a 
E5M: Excitement Seeking –.08 .45 .46 –.24 .03 .82 
E6M: Positive Emotions –.14 .58 .31 .06 .15 .96a 
       
O1M: Fantasy  .20 .19 .61 –.04 –.18 .97a 
O2M: Aesthetics  .11 .08 .66 .14 .19 .99a 
O3M: Feelings  .25 .40 .46 .06 .23 .97a 
O4M: Actions –.36 .25 .48 .01 –.06 .95a 
O5M: Ideas –.07 .11 .68 –.04 .33 .95a 
O6M: Values –.30 .17 .29 .14 –.21 .78 
       
A1M: Trust –.21 .33 .06 .55 –.07 .95a 
A2M: Straightforwardness –.18 –.08 –.07 .65 .12 .96a 
A3M: Altruism –.10 .39 .04 .60 .26 .98a 
A4M: Compliance –.25 –.18 .09 .67 .02 .97a 
A5M: Modesty –.03 –.20 .00 .65 .09 .87b 
A6M: Tender–Mindedness .27 .22 .10 .53 .22 .88b 
       
C1M: Competence –.41 .15 .10 .05 .67 .99a 
C2M: Order –.05 .06 .01 .05 .66 .96a 
C3M: Dutifulness –.06 .08 –.02 .35 .69 .97a 
C4M: Achievement Striving –.05 .26 .21 –.08 .70 .99a 
C5M: Self–Discipline –.29 .09 .05 .08 .72 .98a 
C6M: Deliberation –.26 –.19 .01 .25 .62 .99a 
       
Factor/Total Congruence .95a .97a .92a .97a .97a .96a 
Note: N = 3,214. These are principal components rotated to the American normative target 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992). Loadings greater than .40 in absolute magnitude are given in boldface. 
VCC = Variable congruence coefficient. aCongruence greater than 99% of rotations from random 
data. bCongruence greater than 95% of rotations from random data. 
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Table 2. Factor structure of domain-level method biases (R∆) in a Czech sample. 
 Method Factor  
NEO-PI-R Method Facet  NM EM OM AM CM VCC 
N1M: Anxiety  .79 –.07 .01 –.03 –.03 .99a 
N2M: Angry Hostility .64 .01 –.13 –.43 –.17 .98a 
N3M: Depression  .77 –.16 .03 .02 –.15 .99a 
N4M: Self–Consciousness .72 –.17 –.06 .07 –.02 .98a 
N5M: Impulsiveness .40 .36 .09 –.32 –.31 .97a 
N6M: Vulnerability .68 –.10 –.12 –.10 –.37 .98a 
       
E1M: Warmth –.12 .66 .08 .38 .18 .99a 
E2M: Gregariousness –.10 .64 –.07 .02 –.07 .98a 
E3M: Assertiveness –.40 .34 .17 –.38 .28 .98a 
E4M: Activity .02 .43 .17 –.12 .38 .98a 
E5M: Excitement Seeking .01 .42 .38 –.24 –.13 .87b 
E6M: Positive Emotions –.19 .67 .16 .12 .10 .98a 
       
O1M: Fantasy  .14 .15 .63 –.02 –.21 .97a 
O2M: Aesthetics  .16 .12 .66 .11 .13 .99a 
O3M: Feelings  .22 .41 .50 .10 .14 .97a 
O4M: Actions –.22 .19 .54 .05 –.04 .99a 
O5M: Ideas –.02 .02 .72 –.05 .27 .97a 
O6M: Values –.11 .17 .31 .32 .08 .55 
       
A1M: Trust –.23 .30 .06 .48 –.11 .94a 
A2M: Straightforwardness –.16 –.08 .02 .68 .12 .95a 
A3M: Altruism –.09 .37 .16 .58 .30 .95a 
A4M: Compliance –.27 –.11 .11 .62 .08 .96a 
A5M: Modesty .10 –.12 –.04 .65 .03 .95a 
A6M: Tender–Mindedness .22 .28 .16 .44 .12 .92a 
       
C1M: Competence –.30 .19 .08 .00 .71 .98a 
C2M: Order .06 .07 –.07 .06 .66 .97a 
C3M: Dutifulness –.09 .07 .03 .35 .73 .98a 
C4M: Achievement Striving –.03 .23 .15 –.12 .71 .99a 
C5M: Self–Discipline –.28 .03 .07 .15 .72 .96a 
C6M: Deliberation –.29 –.22 .03 .21 .60 .99a 
       
Factor/Total Congruence .97a .98a .94a .95a .97a .96a 
Note: N = 709. These are principal components rotated to the American normative target (Costa 
& McCrae, 1992). Loadings greater than .40 in absolute magnitude are given in boldface. VCC = 
Variable congruence coefficient. aCongruence greater than 99% of rotations from random data. 
bCongruence greater than 95% of rotations from random data.  
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Table 3. Correlations between method item factors and method facet scales. 
NM 
Facet 
ES  
CZ 
EM 
Facet 
ES 
CZ 
OM 
Facet 
ES 
CZ 
AM 
Facet 
ES 
CZ 
CM 
Facet 
ES 
CZ RI∆ ∆RI RI∆ ∆RI RI∆ ∆RI RI∆ ∆RI RI∆ ∆RI 
Convergent Correlation 
N1M .73 .75 .70 E1M .80 .81 .75 O1M .93 .94 .83 A1M .92 .93 .91 C1M .52 .54 .65 
N2M .80 .80 .78 E2M .83 .86 .85 O2M .89 .88 .85 A2M .75 .77 .76 C2M .85 .87 .77 
N3M .74 .76 .66 E3M .91 .92 .90 O3M .83 .84 .79 A3M .84 .85 .65 C3M .71 .72 .74 
N4M .79 .80 .58 E4M .90 .92 .69 O4M .79 .78 .87 A4M .62 .63 .79 C4M .82 .84 .79 
N5M .78 .79 .88 E5M .75 .74 .79 O5M .93 .96 .88 A5M .92 .93 .85 C5M .62 .64 .64 
N6M .80 .81 .72 E6M .89 .90 .76 O6M .49 .49 .50 A6M .88 .88 .64 C6M .85 .86 .87 
Largest Discriminant Correlation 
 .37 .40 .33     .29 .31 .36     .39 .39 .32  .39 .39 .35  .39 .41 .35 
Mean Absolute Discriminant Correlation 
 .20 .22 .21  .16 .18 .14  .14 .15 .15  .15 .16 .15  .21 .24 .21 
 
Note: These are correlations of a priori scales with corresponding orthogonal method item factors rotated to maximize convergent and 
discriminant validity. For Czech data, only correlations based on the RI∆ matrix are reported. ES = Estonian data, N = 3,214. CZ = Czech 
data, N = 709. See Table 1 for facet labels. 
 
